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Abstract. The increased interest in the use of automated safety analysis is supported by the claim that
manual safety analysis based on traditional techniques is error–prone, costly and not necessarily com-
plete. It is also claimed that traditional techniques are not able to deal with the inherent complexities of
software intensive systems. However, we show in this paper that a transition (from manual to auto-
matic approaches) in the assessment process and technologies is accompanied by an inherent risk of
obtaining false confidence, unless safeguards are provided. The safeguard presented in this paper inte-
grates traditional deductive and inductive analysis techniques with model checking, a form of formal
verification. The aim is to provide the safety analyst with a rigourous approach for the validation of
formal models. The feasibility of the overall approach is illustrated in terms of a case study.
Keywords: model checking, formal verification, traditional safety analysis techniques, deductive and
inductive analysis, formal refinement, requirements.
1. Introduction
The current trend has been to claim that manual traditional safety analysis techniques are error–prone,
costly and not necessarily complete, moreover, it is also claimed that they are not able to deal with the in-
herent complexities of software intensive systems. In this paper, we claim that it is not sufficient to replace
traditional manual techniques for automated counterparts which seem more effective in dealing with highly
complex systems, unless the principles and the rationale behind the traditional safety analysis techniques
are preserved. Moreover, the transition from manual to automatic in the practice of conducting safety analy-
sis either in the technologies or in the process of  assessment is vulnerable to the inherent risk of obtaining
a false confidence.
Over the years traditional safety analysis techniques have provided an effective means by which analysts
are able to generate, in a rigorous manner, failure scenarios that might affect safety, thus obtaining a deep
understanding of the intricacies that affect the safety of complex systems. One merits of traditional safety
analysis techniques is the methodological rigour that forces the analyst to focus on issues related with sys-
tem safety. On the other hand, automatic safety analysis approaches, that aim to replace traditional ones,
lack the methodological rigour which forces the safety analysts to have a comprehensive understanding of
system safety (in terms of faults and their possible consequences). Furthermore, the formal models which
provide the basis for the automatic approaches (the “raw material” of the automated tools) are often impen-
etrable to checks on their accuracy, hence are usually considered as “black boxes” by the safety analyst.
In these circumstances, emphasis changes from completeness of the analysis to accuracy of the modelling,
leading to the separation of two activities which traditionally have been combined for safety analysis.
Automated tools might be effective in dealing with some of the inherent complexities of software based
systems, for example dependencies of many failure modes of system components. However if support is
not provided to enable the analyst to understand the rationale behind key safety–related design choices, then
the  effectiveness of these tools is limited. In our opinion, to reduce the risk of obtaining false confidence,
the application of automated tools should be supported by a deductive and inductive analysis of the formal
models subject to automated analysis. In this paper we present an approach which uses safety analysis tech-
niques for validating formal verification, based on model checking. The domain of application is safety–
critical control systems, particularly those systems which are real–time and hybrid in their nature.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on model checking and the concept of
abstractions, and describes the risks associated with model checking as a safety analysis technique. In Sec-
tion 3 we describe how deductive and inductive analysis can be integrated with model checking in order
to attain higher levels of confidence for the models being analysed. The case study which illustrates the
proposed approach is presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion evaluating our
contribution and indicating directions for future work.
2. Model Checking
Model checking is a formal verification technique based on state exploration. Given a state transition sys-
tem and a property, model checking algorithms exhaustly explore the state space to determine whether the
system satisfies the property. The result is either a claim that the property is true (provision of evidence)
or  a counter–example in terms of a sequence of states that falsifies a property (guidance for risk reduction)
/Chan 98/.
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The diagram of figure 1, schematically represents the basic steps of model checking. The property–based
and operational representations of the concrete model of the system are: 
 and 	
. Concrete mo-
dels might include, for instance, non–linearities which the model checking algorithms are unable to ana-
lyse. Hence the need to translate into linear models, by applying abstractions, to obtain the property–based

) and operational (	
) descriptions of an abstract model.
Abstract interpretation is a technique for the systematic translation of a concrete model to an abstract one
(using conservative approximations), and can be used either for improving the efficiency for analysing a
discrete system by reducing the state explosion /Clarke 94, Heitmeyer 98/, or for approximating nonlinear
hybrid systems /Henzinger 95a/. For both cases, existing approaches may rely on more that one method for
obtaining efficient and precise representations, hence the multiple abstraction levels shown in figure 1. For
example, for reducing the state space, variable restriction and variable abstraction can be used, respective-
ly, to remove irrelevant variables and to replace detailed variables with more abstract ones /Heitmeyer 98/.
In model checking, a key relationship between an abstract model and the concrete model, from which its
is derived, is preservation of properties (essentially invariants) across the models. Ideally an abstract model
(
, 	
) should be both sound (i.e. if 
 is a property of opSSa, 
 is also a property of
	
) and complete (i.e. if it is sound, and 
 is a property of 	
, 
 is also a property of
	
) for the concrete model (
, 	
) with respect to properties of interest. Methods have been
proposed for abstraction that aim to preserve soundness and completeness.
One approach proposed for hybrid automaton /Henzinger 95a/ is to provide general algorithm’s for the
transformation of a concrete (nonlinear) model to an abstract (linear) equivalent. Two schemes are pro-
posed. Clock translation, the resultant abstract model is both sound and complete, however the scheme can
only be applied in the presence of strict conditions. Phase–portrait approximation, although this can be
applied to any hybrid automaton the resultant model is sound but not complete. Another approach proposed
for interpreted finite state machines /Heitmeyer 98/ is to provide methods for the derivation of an abstract
model to support the analysis of a particular property, in the presence of certain conditions. This results in
abstract models that are sound, but may not be complete. In summary, these methods enable an analyst to
obtain confidence (directly from the process of translation) that the results obtained from model checking
the abstract model are applicable to the concrete model.
2.2. Model Checking and Safety Analysis
A typical approach for the application of model checking to safety analysis is: to represent the safety prop-
erty that the system has to satisfy, usually associated with the negation of the system hazard, as the the prop-
erty–based model, and the operational model would represent the system being designed, including the
possible failures of the components of the system. For model checking to be effective as a safety analysis
technique, it should support risk reduction and provide evidence for safety. In terms of risk reduction, model
checking can identify the possible causes for the violation of the properties associated with the model; once
causes are identified the model can be modified to eliminate or mitigate the risk (if both the property and
model cannot be modified then risk remains unchanged). In terms of evidence, model checking can show
that despite failures in the components of the system, the safety properties of the system are not affected
(or if affected the risk associated with the failures is acceptable).
As with any modelling technique, the confidence that can be attributed to the results obtained from model
checking is dependent on the accuracy of the models, hence property–based and operational models should
be validated to confirm they are accurate representations of the actual system. Although it is relatively easy
to check whether the operational model satisfies the specified properties, there are several error sources in
the process of modelling. For example, either the property–based or operational models might have a mis–
representation (inappropriate parameter which defines states/transitions of the automata, or flawed initial
conditions) that allow a property to be confirmed for the model despite it being inappropriate for the real
system. In particular, an analogy can be made with testing when applying model checking as a safety analy-
sis technique: model checking is able to confirm the presence of faults in the model, but not their absence.
Moreover, while testing is able to probe the actual product being developed, model checking is only re-
stricted to probe a representation of the actual product. Hence, additional assurance should be provided that
either the model being checked is an accurate representation of the system, or that all the exposed inaccur-
acies between the model and the actual system do not impact system safety.
In terms of abstract interpretation, although the actual methods for either reducing the state explosion or
for approximating nonlinear hybrid systems might be sound and complete, the process of applying these
methods is still error prone. During the transformation of a concrete specification into a more abstract one
certain details of the models are discarded, these could eliminate some of the causes for a hazardous state.
Although the abstract model might be proven to be safe, there are cases in which it cannot be claimed that
the concrete model is also safe – when the abstract model (, ) is not a sound abstraction of
the concrete model (, ).
In this paper we do not claim that model checking should be avoided as a safety analysis technique. On the
contrary, our claim is that model checking is an effective technique when used with caution, as investigated
for the model checker SMV (Sympolic Model Verification /McMillan 92/) for conducting fault analysis
of chemical plants. Over confidence on the capabilities of model checking without balancing its inherent
risks might lead to some unexpected and undesired situations. An approach for the validation of abstract
interpretations using safety analysis techniques is presented. Instead of validating both the property–based
and the operational models, the focus is on the property–based model. Otherwise the complexity of the pro-
posed approach would be proportional with the the number of states of the operational model.
3. Vulnerability Analysis for Abstraction
The aim of vulnerability analysis (VA), when applied to model checking, is to provide evidence to support
the claim that safety properties of the abstract model are reflected in the concrete model, and to complement
the results obtained from model checking. The mechanics for checking for potential vulnerabilities are
based on the application of  traditional deductive and inductive analysis of the property–based representa-
tions.
 Deductive analysis, in terms of safety analysis,  starts with a hazard and proceeds backwards, seek-
ing possible failures that can lead to the hazard. An example of a method which supports deductive
analysis is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
 Inductive analysis, in terms of safety analysis, starts with a set of failure events and proceeds for-
ward, seeking possible consequences (i.e. hazards) resulting from the events. Typical examples of
methods which support inductive analysis are Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and
Event Tree Analysis (ETA).
The approach being proposed is a safeguard against obtaining false confidence from model checking, or
following inappropriate guidance for risk reduction in the system.  Although the transformation methods
can be sound/complete, it is possible that these methods are not applied in accordance with their guidelines.
Moreover, there are situations in which existing methods for the abstract interpretation of concrete models
are not suitable for a particular application, the analyst is forced to employ ad–hoc approaches to derive
an abstract model. In these cases, although it might not be possible to find an alternative transformation
which is sound/complete, it might nevertheless be effective to conduct the model checking of a correspon-
dent abstract model, to obtain evidence that the risk is acceptable.
To incoporate deductive and inductive analysis into model checking, the original dual language (property–
based and operational) description of systems has to include a third description related with the set of primi-
tive events that lead to the violation of safety properties. The model of the system is then represented as
a triple , , , which also includes the failure model () a predicate that characterises
a set of primitive events (denoted by ) that refer to failures in the system components, or violations
in the system behavioural assumptions.
The complete framework for model checking, including the representation of failure behaviours, is shown
in figure 1. From this framework we can infer the following logical relations. The first two relations estab-
lish the cause–consequence relationship between the occurrence of primitive events and the violation of
a safety property. The occurrence of a primitive event in the concrete model  (asbtract model 	
), is a sufficient condition for the violation of the safety property  (resp. ):
  ,   
The following relation is a term of a refinement relation which also includes safety assumptions and unsafe
states /de Lemos 98/, and states that the violation of an abstract safety property implies the violation of the
correspondent concrete safety property:
  
During the deductive analysis the aim is to identify and compare the set of primitive events of the concrete
and abstract models which can lead to the violation of the safety property. This enables a comparison be-
tween the failure properties of two different models of the same system /Cepin 97/, and can lead to several
possibilities. In terms of safety, the most relevant cases are those in which model checking of the abstract
model leads to inconclusive results: when there is a subset of excluded primitive events (c*=
c–a) which are part of the concrete model, but not part of the abstract model. In these cases, model
checking of the abstract model is not able to identify counter–examples which demonstrate that the safety
property can be violated on the real system. Once these excluded primitive events are identified, the role
of the inductive analysis is to establish the sequence of events that can lead to a system hazard. The outcome
of this analysis will provide the basis to mitigate or eliminate the risk associated with a primitive event. This
provides a complementing means for conducting safety analysis when model checking the concrete model
is not possible. In terms of the diagram of figure 1, the deductive analysis is conducted by comparing the
primitive events of a concrete model with its correspondent abstract interpretation, and the inductive analy-
sis is conducted by identifying the sequence of events that lead to the violation of a safety property, once
an excluded primitive event occurs.
The integration of safety analysis techniques with the abstract interpretation of concrete models is based
on similar work which integrated deductive and inductive analysis with the process of decomposing and
refining safety specifications /de Lemos 98/. For refinement, the main concern is to check what is the impact
in terms of system safety when detailing a specification: new hazards can be introduced, and new assump-
tions have to be identified. Although the process of abstraction is quite different from the refinement of
specifications (in the sense that detail is actually removed from the specifications rather being added), the
safety analysis techniques which have shown to be effective for refinement can also be applied with minor
modifications to abstraction.
3.1. Deductive Analysis
During the deductive analysis the aim is to confirm that the failure properties of the abstract model are con-
sistent with those of the concrete model. The process to achieve this consists of two stages:
 a causal analysis of the concrete (and abstract models) to determine the causes for the violation of
a safety property c (respectively a) in the context of its operational specification c
(a);
 a comparison between the causes for the abstract and concrete models.
The starting point for the causal analysis is to identify the hazard characterized by the negation of the safety
property (i.e. c). The next step is to identify sources of failures which define the causes, known as
primitive events, that lead to the hazard. In this paper, FTA is advocated for the deductive analysis, since
it constraints the analysis by identifying only those behaviours that lead to the violation of specification
c.
The comparison of  c and a can result in five cases. Two extremes are: identical sets (i.e. 
c=a),  the results of model checking are applicable to risk reduction and provision of evidence; dis-
joint sets (i.e ac={}), nothing can be inferred about the safety properties of the concrete
model. The other three (more typical) cases are discussed in detail.
 Event inclusion – the primitive events of the concrete model are a subset of those obtained from the
abstract model (i.e. ca). Evidence is obtained from model checking, however guid-
ance for risk reduction (i.e. counter– examples) for the abstract model may not be applicable to the
concrete model.
 Event exclusion – the primitive events of the concrete model are a superset of those obtained from
the abstract model (i.e. ca). Guidance provided for risk reduction by model checking
the abstract model can be used to modify the concrete model, however evidence that a safety prop-
erty holds for the abstract model may not be applicable to confirmation for the concrete model. Two
strategies can be adopted, to overcome the deficiencies in model checking for this case. In a first
strategy, the impact of the excluded primitive events c* on system safety can be determined
by inductive analysis. An alternative strategy is to define an additional property a*, for which
the corresponding a* will include c*.  In this case confirmation (by model checking)
of both a and a* can be used to confirm c.
 Event overlap – the intersection of the primitive events is a strict subset of the events of the concrete
and abstract models (i.e. =,  and ). In this case both
the evidence and guidance for risk–reduction, obtained from model checking, may not be applicable
for the concrete model. The two strategies proposed in the event exclusion case can also be applied
here. For event overlap these strategies enable the results to be treated as for event inclusion (within
an identified level of risk), or identify other properties over the abstract model to mimic event inclu-
sion.
3.2. Inductive Analysis
Starting from the occurrence of a primitive event the role of inductive analysis of safety specifications is
to determine the sequence of events which can lead to the violation of a safety property. The aim of the in-
ductive analysis is to complement the safety analysis conducted using model checking by probing the
primitive events of the concrete model which are not part of the set of primitive events of the abstract model.
This analysis is necessary for the cases of event exclusion and event overlap, to analyse the impact of ex-
cluded primitive events (). The identification of the sequence of events that leads to the violation
of a safety property establishes potential weakness that the concrete model might have. These weakness
need to be rectified to mitigate or eliminate the risk associated with a particular primitive event, unless the
risk associated with the weakness is acceptable. In this paper, the use of ETA is advocated for conducting
the inductive analysis.
4. Case Study: Industrial Press
4.1. Description of the Case Study
The case study involves establishing design parameters for the safe operation of an industrial press /de
Lemos 96, Holcombe 96/.  The press comprises a plunger, an operator and a programmable logic controller
(PLC).  At its maximum height the plunger is held by a latch.  Once the latch is removed the plunger moves
downwards. Its upward motion is controlled by a motor. The operator controls the movement of the plunger
via two buttons placed one meter apart.  The states of the buttons are interpreted by the PLC which controls
the latch and motor. A diagram of the industrial press, and the forces associated with the plunger are shown
in figure 2.
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The informal requirements for the design of the press aim to ensure its safe operation:
 if the operator releases either button while the press is closing, the plunger should stop before it
closes.
As the plunger is a very heavy object, closing the press is dangerous. Indeed, it should be prevented from
closing fully if the operator can be injured. However, there will be positions in the plunger downward mo-
tion at which the motor will not be able to prevent the plunger from closing fully. At these positions, any
danger will prolonged if we attempt to prevent the press from closing as such an action can only slow the
plunger without stopping it. The point of no return provides the basis for a control strategy which distin-
guishes two basic modes of operation associated with the press:
 the press closes without interruption until it is closed;
 if the press is closing and the operator releases either one of the two buttons while the plunger has
not yet passed the point of no return, then closing is interrupted.
In the following, we will focus on the strategy of stopping the plunger when the operator releases one of
the buttons. In this scenario, a force is applied to the plunger which hinders the press to close. The system
is intrinsically nonlinear, described by the concrete model. Whether the press will close depends on the
parameters which describe the press, and the height of the plunger when an external force is applied. How-
ever,  in the following we show that model checking can produce different outcomes depending on the ad
hoc abstractions which are employed over the concrete model.
4.2. Property–Based Model of the Industrial Press
The concrete model of the industrial press was originally specified using Extended Real–Time Logic /de
Lemos 96, Hall 96/ (an outline of ERTL is presented in Appendix A). The abstract model was specified
using Hybrid Automata and the model checker HYTECH /Henzinger 95b/ was used to check the safety
properties of the abstract model (although HYTECH does not support the implementation of ICTL model
checking, many real–time requirements can be reduced to reachability analysis).
In the following subsections, for the sake of brevity,  we focus on the property–based representations of
the industrial press. The correspondent operational models of both the concrete and abstract representations
are presented in Appendix B. To represent the concrete model in a concise form, we have employed the
notation of Hybrid Automata, as a graphical representation for the ERTL model /de Lemos 96/. The system
is defined in terms of four state machines:  – to model the states of the  plunger;  – models
the position of the operator in relation to the plunger;  – models the state of the two buttons;
and  – a specification for the PLC. Common event labels are used to represent synchronisataion
between the component state machines.
In the concrete model, the states of the +'/)%#, are defined in terms of position 2), velocity (2) and accel-
eration (2). The nonlinearities of the concrete model do not permit model checking. Hence abstract inter-
pretations that eliminate the constraints over acceleration, need to be applied to obtain a linear model. Un-
fortunately methods based on variable restriction cannot be directly applied to 2, without adjusting the
value of other parameters, since the property of interest is dependent on 2. The method of clock translation
is not applicable and though phase–portrait approximation can be applied, its application for this system
is not straightforward (several options were studied). The  +'/)%#, machine for the abstract model, pres-
ented in figure B.4, was obtained by eliminating constraints on 2 and where deemed appropriate adjusting
the constraints on y’ to take into account the affects of 2.
4.2.1. ERTL Model of the Industrial Press
The safety property is defined in the context of the ERTL operational model, in particular the states of the
+'/)%#, and *+#, .*, machines. The initial step for defining the safety property is to identify the system
hazard  3 ," which occurs whenever the operator enters a hazard state  3 ," (i.e. places his
hands in the target area of the plunger) while the plunger also enters a hazard state '*-#" 3 ,".
.  ( 3 ,", .)  ('*-#" 3 ,", .) ( 3 ,", .).
The plunger can only enter into a hazard state when the press closes while attempting to stop the plunger
(.*++&)%). The following relation states that for the plunger to be in a hazard state, there exists a previ-
ous time point at which the plunger was stopping.
.  ('*-#" 3 ,", .)  .  . : (.*++&)%, .).
This relation can be rewritten by replacing the system predicate .*++&)% with the variables that char-
acterize the state.
.  ('*-#" 3 ,", .)  
.  . : (022( 10!2
2%2	, .).
4.2.2. HYTECH Model of the Industrial Press
In HYTECH the safety property previously can be reduced into a reachability analysis problem. Two re-
gions are defined an initial region (a composite of initial conditions for the state machines), and a final re-
gion (typically the negation of the property to be confirmed). HYTECH then aims to compute a path from
the initial region to the final region, if one exists a counter–example is provided otherwise the property is
confirmed.
For the abstract model of the industrial press, the initial region is defined as:
&)&.,#%  '*!+'/)%#,+#)#"  2
 
'*!*+#, .*,)&.  '*!*+).#,$ !#* 
'*!!*).,*''#,+#)#"*)#
The final region is simply the definition of :
$&) ',#%  '*!+'/)%#,  '*-#" 3 ,"  '*!*+#, .*, 3 ,"
If the reachability analysis confirms that $&) ',#% is not reachable, we can conclude the safety property
is an invariant for the abstract (HYTECH) model.
4.3. Vulnerability Analysis
In the following we analyse the impact on safety of the elimination of acceleration from the dynamic model
of the plunger. Intuitively, we can summarise the risk posed by this scenario as follows. If the acceleration
is eliminated from the abstract model then the plunger in the concrete model may take longer to close from
the same specified position. Hence, even if the reachability analysis confirms for the abstract model that
the plunger will close before the operator can enter the hazard state, the same cannot be claimed for the
concrete model unless further analysis is conducted. This scenario corresponds to event exclusion men-
tioned previously.
4.3.1. Deductive Analysis of the Abstract and Concrete Models
Step 1: Causal Analysis of Concrete model. The causes for the top event .)  are the plunger being
in%'*! .) and the operator being in .) . The fault tree summarising the causal analysis
is shown in figure 3, in the following we focus on the causes for %'*! .)   is caused by
the plunger being in state %'*!  a  occurring (this event synchronises with the operator) and
the position of - being too low for the given velocity and acceleration. This analysis leads to three primitive
events for the plunger: 	 – downward velocity too high, 
– upward acceleration too low and 
– both velocity and acceleration. 
.) 
.) %'*! .) 
%'*$&#

-- -
	 y = (v, a)  y’<v y’’=a;

 y = (v, a)  y’= v y’’<a;
 y = (v, a)  y’< v y’’<a;
Figure 3. Fault tree for concrete model.
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Key – primitive events:
Step 2: Causal Analysis of Abstract model.  The fault tree for the abstract model (figure 4) differs in the
causes for %'*! .) , now these are: state %'*$&#, occurrence of BREAK and the downward
velocity is  too high (PE). 
.) 
.) %'*! .) 
%'*$&#

 y = (v)  y’<v
Figure 4.  Extract of fault tree for abstract model.
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Step 3: Comparative Analysis of Causes. The predicate that characterises the primitive event sets for the
concrete model (! = 	  
, and for the abstract model (! = . The  predicate for
the excluded events is:
(!  -=(, -=( -,-
The set  corresponds to the situations in which a hazard occurs due to the acceleration being too
low for the given velocity.
4.3.2. Inductive Analysis of the Concrete Models
The inductive analysis starts with the an event in the set  
	  %$%  To ana-
lyse the impact of this event on 
, the state of the plunger (i.e if it is 	!), the occurrence
of  and the state of the operator (i.e. if it is & ) are analysed by the event tree in figure 5.
	!
Figure 5. Event tree for the concrete model.
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From the event tree, we can infer that the excluded events are hazardous if the plunger is in 	! and
the event  occurs and the operator is in & .  The risk posed by the excluded events, would
be mitigated if  never occurs during 	!. However, since these are represented as expected
events and states (figure 3) this has a minimal affect on risk reduction. A more substantial mitigating factor,
is the state & . The event  acts as a synchronisataion point that marks the start of a race
between the plunger entering 	!&  (assuming it does not succeed to stop) and the operator
entering & . For those circumstances in which the plunger enters 	!&  before the
operator enters & , the risk posed by the excluded events is mitigated.
4.4. Remarks
The above VA shows that selecting a particular value for the velocity of the plunger in the state "
is problematic. One alternative is define a range e.g. [–3/2, 0], however this leads to an inherently unsafe
abstract model. Since a hazard can occur regardless of the delay assumed in the operator moving from
! to & .
In addition to providing the raw results the VA increases the understanding of the circumstances that lead
to & , these circumstances can viewed as the result of two races started by :
1. In the plunger the race is between closing (i.e % reaching 0) and stopping (i.e. % reaching 0),
closing wins if  %<( . 
2. Between the plunger and the operator the race is between closing and the operator entering
& , the operator can win if the minimum time to enter &  from ! is less than
the maximum time to enter 	!& .
The value of the acceleration affects the result of race 1, if elimination of acceleration decreases the maxi-
mum time the plunger takes to close the (safe) minimum time for the operator to enter &  would
be computed incorrectly. Viewing the causes in the time domain, suggests that a translation of the concrete
model into a model based on  representing the maximum time between a  and entering
	!&  could lead to a sound abstract model for 
. Such an approach can be viewed
as a combination of clock translation and directed variable restriction.
5. Conclusions
Although the model checking literature provides techniques which are sound and complete for obtaining
abstract interpretations from concrete models, nevertheless the application of these techniques are still error
prone (when  not applied appropriately). Means to validate these abstract interpretations are necessary in
order to obtain the required confidence that the abstract models obtained are indeed sufficiently accurate.
In this paper we have presented an approach based on deductive and inductive analysis for the validation
of the abstract models. We recognize the fact that the application of these techniques in complex systems
is limited, however if the usage of these techniques is restricted to the property–based representations then
we are able to scope their complexity. Furthermore, the traditional safety analysis techniques could have
the same role as the dependency graph browser of the Software Cost Reduction (SCR) method, in automati-
cally removing irrelevant variables from the model.
Another aspect that might hinder the utilization of model checking as a safety analysis technique is the lack
of a methodological support for guiding its use when conducting safety analysis. Testing, for example, is
a validation technique which relies on a wide range of strategies, such as black box testing, and random
testing, to ensure that the risk associated with a particular system is acceptable. Once similar methodologi-
cal support is defined, confidence can be placed on model checking as a safety analysis technique.
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Appendix A. Extended Real Time Logic (ERTL)
Extended Real Time Logic (ERTL) /de Lemos 96, Hall 96/ is a first order predicate logic for the modelling
and analysis of hybrid systems, taking as a basis Jahanian & Mok’s Real Time Logic (RTL) /Jahanian 86,
Jahanian 88/. RTL uses uninterpreted predicates to relate events of a system to the time of their occurrence,
thereby providing the means for reasoning about absolute timing properties of real–time systems. The ex-
tensions provided by ERTL allow reasoning about system behaviour in both value and time domains
through predicates defined in terms of system variables.
The occurrence relation () captures the notion of real time by assigning a time value to each occurrence
of an event. (e, i, t) defines that the ith occurrence of event e occurs at time t.
t i
 P: (MotorOn, i, t)
The ith occurrence of event  has occurred at time t.
A transition event is defined by the transition of a system predicate from false to true, or from true to false,
at a particular time point. For a system predicate P, the respective transition events are P and P.
t i
 P: ((plateOnBeg  beltOn), i, t)  
((	plateOnEnd  	beltOn), i, t)
The transition event which captures the instant which the conjunction of the predicates 
	 and

 becomes false is equivalent to the transition event which captures the instant that the negation of
either 
	 or 
 becomes true.
The holding relation () captures whether a system predicate holds true at a time point. (f, i, t) defines
that a formula f holds for the ith time, at time t.
t i
 P: (moveDown, i, t)  (bottom  plateOn, i, t)
The predicate  holds true iff the conjunction of the predicates  and 
 also holds
true.
Appendix B. Operational Model of the Industrial Press
B.1. ERTL Model of the Industrial Press
The concrete model of the industrial press was originally specified using Extended Real–Time Logic
(ERTL) /de Lemos 96, Hall 96/. In the following, we have also employed the notation of Hybrid Automata
in order to obtain a graphical representation for the ERTL model.
B.1.1. Model of the Plunger
Variables
The set of variables is V  {y, y’, y’’}:
Variables Range Comments Units
 R 
 
	   
 


    


 R The velocity of the plunger,

    

	
 R The acceleration of the plunger,

    

	

Control Locations
The set of control locations is  = {P_Opened, P_Closing, P_Closed_Safe, P_Closed_Hazard, P_Stop-
ping, P_Stopped, P_Opening}:
P_Opened – the press is opened, and the plunger is up:
t  (P_Opened, t)  (yymaxy’0y’’0, t);
P_Closing – the press is closing, and the plunger is moving down:
t  (P_Closing, t)  (0yymax–vcy’0y’’(–Fg–By’)/M, t);
P_Closed_Safe – the plunger is down, and the press has closed safely:
t  (P_Closed_Safe, t)  (y0	y’0	y’’0, t)	 
t’  (P_Closed_Safe, t’)  (P_Closing_TwoB, t’);
P_Closed_Hazard – the press has closed, while the plunger was stopping:
t  (P_Closed_Hazard, t)   (y0	y’0	y’’0, t)	
t’  (P_Closed_Hazard, t’) 
(P_Stopping, t’) 
 (P_Closing_One/NoB, t’));
P_Stopping – the plunger is stopping:
t  (P_Stopping, t)  (0yymax	–vcy0	y’’(FH–Fg–By’)/M, t);
P_Stopped – the plunger has stopped:
t  (P_Stopped, t)  (0yymax	y’0	y’’0, t).
P_Opening – the press is opening, and the plunger is moving up:
t  (P_Opening, t)  (0yymax	y’vo	y’’0, t).
Transition Events
The set of transition events is  = {P_Opened, P_Closing,  P_Closed_Safe, P_Closed_Hazard,
P_Stopping, P_Stopped, P_Opening}:
t  (P_Opened, t)  (P_Opening, t);
t  (P_Closing, t)  (P_Opened, t);
t  (P_Closed_Safe, t)  (P_Closing, t);
t  (P_Closed_Hazard, t)  (P_Stopping, t);
t  (P_Stopping, t)  (P_Closing, t);
t  (P_Stopped, t)  (P_Stopping, t);
t  (P_Opening, t)  (P_Closed_Safe, t) 

(P_Closed_Hazard, t)
 (P_Closed_Stopped, t);
Events
The set of events is  = {CLOSE, BREAK, BOTTOM, STOPPED, OPEN, TOP}:
CLOSE – the plunger starts to move down:
t  (CLOSE, t)  (P_Closing, t);
BREAK – the plunger starts to stop:
t  (BREAK, t)  (P_Stopping, t);
BOTTOM – the plunger reaches the bottom of the press:
t  (BOTTOM, t)  (P_Closed_Safe, t) 
 (P_Closed_Hazard, t);
STOPPED – the plunger stops:
t  (STOPPED, t)  (P_Stopped, t);
OPEN – the plunger starts to move up:
t  (OPEN, t)  (P_Opening, t);
TOP – the plunger reaches the top of the press:
t  (TOP, t)  (P_Opened, t);
Initial Condition
As initial condition we assume that the plunger is the press is opened, and the plunger is up:
(P_Opened, t).
Hybrid Automata
The model consists of seven states (Figure B.1):	, plunger is fully opened; 	, plunger
is closing; 	, plunger is stopping; 	, plunger closes safely; 	,
a BOTTOM has occurred after 
 and plunger closes in a hazardous situation; 	, plunger
has stopped before closing; and 	 plunger is open. 
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B.1.2. Model of the Operator
Control Locations
The set of control locations is  = {O_Init, O_Safe, O_Unsafe, O_Hazard}:
O_Init – the press is open;
O_Safe – the operator presses the two buttons;
O_Unsafe – the press is closing, the operator releases a buton, and the hands are in the unsafe region;
O_Hazard – the press is either closing or closed, one of the butons is released, and the hands are in the hazard
region;
Transition Events
The set of transition events is  = {O_Init, O_Safe, O_Unsafe, O_Hazard}:
t  (O_Init, t)  (O_Init, t);
t  (O_Safe, t)  (O_Init, t);
t  (O_Unsafe, t)  (O_Safe, t);
t  (O_Hazard, t)  (O_Unsafe, t)  (O_Hazard, t);
Events
The set of events is  = {OPOB, OPTB, OROB, ORTB}:
OPOB – the operator presses one button:
t  (OPOB, t)  (O_Init, t);
OPTB – the operator presses the two buttons:
t  (OPTB, t)  (O_Safe, t);
OROB – the operator releases one button:
t  (OROB, t)  (O_Unsafe, t);
Initial Condition
As initial condition we assume that the plunger is the press is opened, and the plunger is up:
(O_Init, t).
Hybrid Automata
The model of the operator consists of four states (Figure B.2): , the initial state of the operator;

	,  this corresponds to the situation when the operator presses two buttons on the plunger; 
	
this corresponds to the situation when one of the Buttons is released; and  when the operators
hands are in the targer area of the plunger. 
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B.1.3. Model of the Operator Interface
Control Locations
The set of control locations is  = {OI_NoB, OI_OneB, OI_TwoB}:
OI_NoB – no buttons are pressed;
OI_OneB – one of the buttons is pressed:
OI_TwoB – the two buttons are pressed.
Transition Events
The set of transition events is  = {OI_NoB, OI_OneB, OI_TwoB}:
t  (OI_OneB, t)  (OI_NoB, t)  (OI_TwoB, t);
t  (OI_TwoB, t)  (OI_OneB, t);
t  (OI_NoB, t)  (OI_OneB, t);
Events
The set of event constants is  = {OPOB, OPTB, OROB, ORTB}:
OPOB – operator presses one button;
t  (OPOB, t)  (OI_OneB, t);
OPTB – operator presses two buttons;
t  (OPTB, t)  (OI_TwoB, t);
OROB – operator releases one button;
t  (OROB, t)  (OI_OneB, t);
ORTB – operator releases two buttons.
t  (ORTB, t)  (OI_NoB, t);
Initial Condition
As initial condition we assume that the operator has not pressed any buttons:
(OI_NoB, 0).
Hybrid Automata
The model consists of three states (Figure B.3): 
, none of the buttons are pressed; 	, one
of the buttons is pressed; and 
 both of the buttons are pressed. The events of this model synchron-
ise with the operator. 
	
		
	
	
	
	

	
		
      
B.1.4. Model of the Controller
Control Locations
The set of control locations is  = {C_Opened_NoB/OneB, C_Opened_TwoB, C_Closing_TwoB, C_Clos-
ing_OneB/NoB, C_Closed_Safe, C_Closed_Hazard, C_Stopping, C_Stopped, C_Opening}:
C_Opened_NoB/OneB – the press is opened, and the operator has not pressed the two buttons:
t  (C_Opened_NoB/OneB, t)  
(P_Opened, t)((OI_NoB, t)(OI_OneB, t));
C_Opened_TwoB – the press is opened, and the operator is pressing the two buttons:
t  (C_Opened_TwoB, t)  (P_Opened, t)(OI_TwoB, t);
C_Closing_TwoB – the plunger is moving down, and the operator is pressing the two buttons:
t  (C_Closing_TwoB, t)  (P_Closing, t)(OI_TwoB, t);
C_Closing_NoB/OneB – the plunger is moving down, and the operator is either pressing only one button
or none at all:
t  (C_Closing_OneB/NoB, t)  
(P_Closing, t)((OI_NoB, t)(OI_OneB, t));
C_Closed_Safe – the plunger is down, and the press has closed safely:
t  (C_Closed_Safe, t)  (P_Closed_Safe, t);
C_Closed_Hazard – the press has closed while the plunger was stopping:
t  (C_Closed_Hazard, t)   (P_Closed_Hazard, t);
C_Stopping – the plunger is stopping:
t  (C_Stopping, t)  (P_Stopping, t);
C_Stopped – the plunger has stopped:
t  (C_Stopped, t)  (P_Stopped, t).
C_Opening – the press is opening, and the plunger is moving up:
t  (C_Opening, t)  (P_Opening, t).
Transition Events
The set of transition events is  = {C_Opened_NoB/OneB, C_Opened_TwoB, C_Closing_TwoB,
C_Closing_OneB/NoB, C_Closed_Safe, C_Closed_Hazard, C_Stopping, C_Stopped,
C_Opening}:
t  (C_Opened_NoB/OneB, t)  (C_Opening, t);
t  (C_Opened_TwoB, t)  (C_Opened_NoB/OneB, t);
t  (C_Closing_TwoB, t)  (C_Opened_TwoB, t);
t  (C_Closing_OneB/NoB, t)  (C_Closing_TwoB, t);
t  (C_Closed_Safe, t)  (C_Closing_TwoB, t);
t  (C_Closed_Hazard, t)  
(C_Closing_OneB/NoB, t)(C_Stopping, t);
t  (C_Stopping, t)  (C_Closing_OneB/NoB, t);
t  (C_Stopped, t)  (C_Stopping, t);
t  (C_Opening, t)  
(C_Closed_Safe, t)(C_Closed_Hazard, t)
(C_Closed_Stopped, t);
Events
The set of events is  = {CLOSE, BREAK, BOTTOM, STOPPED, OPEN, TOP, OPTB, OROB}:
t  (OPTB, t)  (C_Opened_TwoB, t);
t  (OROB, t)  (C_Closing_OneB/NoB, t);
t  (CLOSE, t)  (C_ClosingTwoB, t);
t  (BREAK, t)  (C_Stopping, t);
t  (BOTTOM, t)  (C_Closed_Safe, t)  (C_Closed_Hazard, t);
t  (STOPPED, t)  (C_Stopped, t);
t  (OPEN, t)  (C_Opening, t);
t  (TOP, t)  (C_Opened_NoB/OneB, t);
Initial Condition
As initial condition we assume that the press is opened, and the operator has not pressed any buttons:
(C_Opened_NoB/OneB, 0).
Hybrid Automata
The model consists of nine states (Figure B.4) and can be viewed as a composite of the plunger model and
operator interface model. The states are described as: 		, corresponds to the situ-
ation when none or one button is pressed; 		. the situation when both buttons are pressed;
		, both buttons are pressed and the plunger is closing; 		
, the plunger
closed safely; 		

, the plunger closed in a hazardous situation; 		,
a button has been released while the plunger is closing; 	, the plunger is stopping; and
	, the plunger is opening. 
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B.2. HYTECH Model of the Industrial Press
The HYTECH model also consists of four Hybrid Automota.The descriptions of the machines for the oper-
ator, operator interface and controller are not affected by the abstract interpertation that removes acceler-
ation. Only the model of the plunger differs between the ERTL and HYTECH models.
B.2.1. Model of the Plunger
This model (figure B.5) consists of the same seven states as the ERTL model.The main differences are the
elimination of the constraints over acceleration, and adjusting the constraint over velocity in 	


to be –3/2, in order to take into account acceleration. Also some of the strict inequalities over velocity are
replaced by strict inequalities, and  is defined as a constant 20.
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